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Injected54
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DBfan187
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- #19,925
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea, is located in Eastern Asia and occupies the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. To its west lies Korea Bay and to the East is the Sea of Japan. North Korea shares its northern border with China and its southern border with the Republic of Korea, or South Korea. The capital city of North Korea is Pyongyang (“Background Note: North Korea”). The estimated population in 2008 was roughly 23.5 million people. Kim Yong Il currently heads a highly centralized communist dictatorship system of government. North Korea operates a centrally directed economy, which is one of the most closed in the world (“CIA World Factbook”). This economy doesn’t produce enough output to maintain the population, and North Korea is highly dependent upon foreign aid as a source of support. Recent estimates attribute roughly one third of revenue as originating from foreign aid, one third from traditional exports, and one third from non-traditional sources such as drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and missile sales (Rotberg 92).
The primary concern driving American foreign policy toward North Korea since the end of the Second World War has been security. The primary value driving United States foreign policy is self preservation in the face of threats, both internal to North Korea in recent years, and external to North Korea in the historical context of the Cold War.
Prior to Japanese colonization in 1905, and complete annexation in 1910, the Korean Peninsula had operated as an independent and sovereign entity for much of its long history. The Peninsula remained under Japanese control until the Japanese surrendered after the nuclear attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima (“CIA World Factbook”). The surrender immediately triggered a division of the Peninsula with the Soviet Union having operational control north of the 38ths parallel and the United States administering the southern portion of the Peninsula. This was initially envisioned as a temporary division until such a time when the United States, Russia, and China could arrange for a trustee administration (“Background Note: North Korea”).
In Moscow in December of 1945, a joint American-Soviet commission was formed which tried to hammer out a framework for a national government. The two super powers quickly deadlocked. In 1947, after several years of fruitless meetings held in Seoul, the United States brought the matter before the United Nations General Assembly. The reality of the Cold War competition between world super powers quickly dashed any initial hopes for a reunified Korean Peninsula. In 1948, two separate nations were established, the Soviet supported Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the American backed Republic of Korea. The political and social systems implemented in the newly created neighboring counties were diametrically opposed (“Background Note: North Korea”).
While the North was receiving substantial support from the Soviet Union, the Soviets never viewed North Korea as important as satellite governments in Eastern Europe. In contrast, the United States viewed South Korea as positioned to harbor a first line of defense for Japan which would quickly regain its industrial powerhouse status while being stripped of its military and political might (Smith 22). Additionally, the United States was increasingly worried about Soviet hegemony around the globe. South Korea was seen as the symbol of America’s commitment to constraining communism in Asia, although, like the Soviets in Eastern Europe, the Unites States wasn’t willing to make the same commitments to South Korea that it had made to its European allies (Kaufman, Burton 24).
Truman saw South Korea in the same light as Greece and Turkey and in 1948 sent a military advisory group and a Marshal Plan type aid package. Regardless of the view Truman held, Congress refused to fund a 600 billion dollar aid package that would have put South Korea on par with Greece and Turkey (Smith 23). However, “the United States had drawn the line in Korea, and this commitment governed the Truman/Acheson decision to come to the defense of the ROK in 1950” (Smith 23).
By early 1950, North Korea had a military advantage over its southern neighbors, specifically having better equipment and an air force. While the North was gradually building up troops and tanks along the 38th parallel, the conventional thinking that guided American policy toward North Korea, was that an attack was unlikely and certainly not imminent (Kaufman, Burton 27). Nevertheless, the situation that was developing was seen in the context of the increasingly worrisome larger Cold War. Mao’s victory in China, and communist uprisings in Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were all seen as threats to American power and influence (Kaufman, Burton 27). While it is unlikely that the United States was unprepared for indirect conflict with the Soviet Union in Asia, it is likely that they did not anticipate that proxy conflict occurring on the Korean Peninsula (Kaufman, Burton 29).
Nonetheless, war broke out on the Korean Peninsula in June of 1950 when the North Koreans launched a surprise invasion of South Korea (Kaufman, Burton 29). Amid early victories by North Korea, American foreign policy was quickly redirected from an emphasis on providing aid to South Korea, to providing them with combat troops and military might. The North Koreans enjoyed early victories but were quickly rolled back after US troops successfully made amphibious landings at Inchon in September of 1950. With the tide now turning against the North, the United States marched north in an attempt to overthrow the communist regime. The decision to undertake the complete occupation of the peninsula and the elimination of the communist North Korean government brought Chinese forces into combat on the side of North Korea.
With the introduction of the Chinese troops, the United States was pushed back to the 38th parallel once again (Smith 23). The seesaw action of the occupation, which at times might have seemed perilously close to victory and defeat for both sides, had ended in a stalemate along the lines from which the confrontation had initially begun. On July 27th 1953, both sides signed The Korean War Armistice Agreement, which ended the open hostility of the conflict (“Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement”). North Korea had failed to realize its goal of a unified Korean Peninsula under its control, and the United States had failed to see its goal of communist rollback on the peninsula come to fruition.
From a historical perspective, what guided American foreign policy toward North Korea during the Korean War was clear. Traditional thinking at the time was that the North Koreans had invaded under the direction of the Soviet Union and with the tacit consent of China (Kaufman, Burton 32). Under the doctrine that a victory for communism anywhere was a defeat of democracy everywhere, the United States’ involvement in, and the reaction garnered to, hostilities from the North, was predictable and justified. However, the evidence now suggests that while the war that played out most certainly was consistent with the larger Cold War between Washington and Moscow, when “the North apparently attacked the South unilaterally and without the knowledge of either the Soviet Union or the PRC,” clearly Korean internal struggles were also a factor.(Kaufman, Burton 32).
All the same, the two Koreas’ domestic political issues were not what guided the United States during the conflict. The larger interests in the Cold War during this period guided American foreign policy in general and the police action against North Korea was no exception. The United States saw the North Korean invasion as a communist attack against free world interests as well as sponsored and controlled by the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of the United States, this was a test of American resolve and the response had to send a clear and concise message that America would protect its interests in not only Asia, but worldwide. Of great concern was that a loss in South Korea would guide communist moves around the world and could have been the first of many Soviet thrusts globally, and that these would come at the cost of both American influence and power worldwide (Kaufman, Burton 34). The United States, in order to protect its status and image, had to send a strong message to both its adversaries and allies. That message was that the United States would not stand by idly in the face of Soviet aggression and communist expansion, and that America would take whatever steps necessary to protect its interests and the independence of its allies.
Two lessons are learned from the brief outline of Korean history and American foreign policy toward the Peninsula provided here. First, American military superiority, particularly nuclear weaponry, was instrumental in securing freedom from Japanese control and should not be underestimated. Second, the world’s super powers were more interested in using the Korean Peninsula as a pawn in their own struggles than it was in Korean unification or the plight of the Korean people. These lessons are important to recall when examining what makes up the bulk of American foreign policy toward North Korea today, a nuclear armed rogue nation and an obvious security threat to the United States and its global interests.
The primary concern driving American foreign policy toward North Korea since the end of the Second World War has been security. The primary value driving United States foreign policy is self preservation in the face of threats, both internal to North Korea in recent years, and external to North Korea in the historical context of the Cold War.
Prior to Japanese colonization in 1905, and complete annexation in 1910, the Korean Peninsula had operated as an independent and sovereign entity for much of its long history. The Peninsula remained under Japanese control until the Japanese surrendered after the nuclear attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima (“CIA World Factbook”). The surrender immediately triggered a division of the Peninsula with the Soviet Union having operational control north of the 38ths parallel and the United States administering the southern portion of the Peninsula. This was initially envisioned as a temporary division until such a time when the United States, Russia, and China could arrange for a trustee administration (“Background Note: North Korea”).
In Moscow in December of 1945, a joint American-Soviet commission was formed which tried to hammer out a framework for a national government. The two super powers quickly deadlocked. In 1947, after several years of fruitless meetings held in Seoul, the United States brought the matter before the United Nations General Assembly. The reality of the Cold War competition between world super powers quickly dashed any initial hopes for a reunified Korean Peninsula. In 1948, two separate nations were established, the Soviet supported Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the American backed Republic of Korea. The political and social systems implemented in the newly created neighboring counties were diametrically opposed (“Background Note: North Korea”).
While the North was receiving substantial support from the Soviet Union, the Soviets never viewed North Korea as important as satellite governments in Eastern Europe. In contrast, the United States viewed South Korea as positioned to harbor a first line of defense for Japan which would quickly regain its industrial powerhouse status while being stripped of its military and political might (Smith 22). Additionally, the United States was increasingly worried about Soviet hegemony around the globe. South Korea was seen as the symbol of America’s commitment to constraining communism in Asia, although, like the Soviets in Eastern Europe, the Unites States wasn’t willing to make the same commitments to South Korea that it had made to its European allies (Kaufman, Burton 24).
Truman saw South Korea in the same light as Greece and Turkey and in 1948 sent a military advisory group and a Marshal Plan type aid package. Regardless of the view Truman held, Congress refused to fund a 600 billion dollar aid package that would have put South Korea on par with Greece and Turkey (Smith 23). However, “the United States had drawn the line in Korea, and this commitment governed the Truman/Acheson decision to come to the defense of the ROK in 1950” (Smith 23).
By early 1950, North Korea had a military advantage over its southern neighbors, specifically having better equipment and an air force. While the North was gradually building up troops and tanks along the 38th parallel, the conventional thinking that guided American policy toward North Korea, was that an attack was unlikely and certainly not imminent (Kaufman, Burton 27). Nevertheless, the situation that was developing was seen in the context of the increasingly worrisome larger Cold War. Mao’s victory in China, and communist uprisings in Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were all seen as threats to American power and influence (Kaufman, Burton 27). While it is unlikely that the United States was unprepared for indirect conflict with the Soviet Union in Asia, it is likely that they did not anticipate that proxy conflict occurring on the Korean Peninsula (Kaufman, Burton 29).
Nonetheless, war broke out on the Korean Peninsula in June of 1950 when the North Koreans launched a surprise invasion of South Korea (Kaufman, Burton 29). Amid early victories by North Korea, American foreign policy was quickly redirected from an emphasis on providing aid to South Korea, to providing them with combat troops and military might. The North Koreans enjoyed early victories but were quickly rolled back after US troops successfully made amphibious landings at Inchon in September of 1950. With the tide now turning against the North, the United States marched north in an attempt to overthrow the communist regime. The decision to undertake the complete occupation of the peninsula and the elimination of the communist North Korean government brought Chinese forces into combat on the side of North Korea.
With the introduction of the Chinese troops, the United States was pushed back to the 38th parallel once again (Smith 23). The seesaw action of the occupation, which at times might have seemed perilously close to victory and defeat for both sides, had ended in a stalemate along the lines from which the confrontation had initially begun. On July 27th 1953, both sides signed The Korean War Armistice Agreement, which ended the open hostility of the conflict (“Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement”). North Korea had failed to realize its goal of a unified Korean Peninsula under its control, and the United States had failed to see its goal of communist rollback on the peninsula come to fruition.
From a historical perspective, what guided American foreign policy toward North Korea during the Korean War was clear. Traditional thinking at the time was that the North Koreans had invaded under the direction of the Soviet Union and with the tacit consent of China (Kaufman, Burton 32). Under the doctrine that a victory for communism anywhere was a defeat of democracy everywhere, the United States’ involvement in, and the reaction garnered to, hostilities from the North, was predictable and justified. However, the evidence now suggests that while the war that played out most certainly was consistent with the larger Cold War between Washington and Moscow, when “the North apparently attacked the South unilaterally and without the knowledge of either the Soviet Union or the PRC,” clearly Korean internal struggles were also a factor.(Kaufman, Burton 32).
All the same, the two Koreas’ domestic political issues were not what guided the United States during the conflict. The larger interests in the Cold War during this period guided American foreign policy in general and the police action against North Korea was no exception. The United States saw the North Korean invasion as a communist attack against free world interests as well as sponsored and controlled by the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of the United States, this was a test of American resolve and the response had to send a clear and concise message that America would protect its interests in not only Asia, but worldwide. Of great concern was that a loss in South Korea would guide communist moves around the world and could have been the first of many Soviet thrusts globally, and that these would come at the cost of both American influence and power worldwide (Kaufman, Burton 34). The United States, in order to protect its status and image, had to send a strong message to both its adversaries and allies. That message was that the United States would not stand by idly in the face of Soviet aggression and communist expansion, and that America would take whatever steps necessary to protect its interests and the independence of its allies.
Two lessons are learned from the brief outline of Korean history and American foreign policy toward the Peninsula provided here. First, American military superiority, particularly nuclear weaponry, was instrumental in securing freedom from Japanese control and should not be underestimated. Second, the world’s super powers were more interested in using the Korean Peninsula as a pawn in their own struggles than it was in Korean unification or the plight of the Korean people. These lessons are important to recall when examining what makes up the bulk of American foreign policy toward North Korea today, a nuclear armed rogue nation and an obvious security threat to the United States and its global interests.
ngsm13
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- Thread Starter
- #19,927
A brief history of nuclear weaponry on the Korean Peninsula is in order prior to examining the first nuclear showdown that occurred in the 1990s. Nuclear weapons first arrived on the Peninsula in the late 1950s (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”). Ironically, the United States introduced them to deter further Northern Aggression against the South. American deployment of nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula broke article 13D of the Armistice Agreement, and was of great concern to North Korea since their introduction (Smith 24). At the height of build up about 950 nuclear weapons were deployed at US bases in South Korea (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”).
After they were introduced in 1958, the early use of nuclear weapons was central to American battle planning for any new armed conflict on the Peninsula. North Korea’s defensive posture is a result of this perceived U.S. nuclear threat. The North continues to station large numbers of troops along the North-South border so that, prior to an American nuclear strike, Northern troops can quickly cross into the South and intermingle with the population (Smith 24). The desire to counter this American nuclear threat weighed heavily on the North Koreans, although it has only been in the last few decades that they have obtained the technology to realize this desire. Furthermore, North Korea claims the right to develop a nuclear weapons program under international law, as means of self defense (Smith 24).
In the early 1980s North Korea began building a five megawatt reactor and in 1985 they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The reactor was completed and operational by 1986 (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 409). The United States has always taken the position that North Korea should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. However, the fact that the United States harbored nuclear weapons in South Korea made it difficult for the US to argue this. In 1991, as a part of a larger recall of nuclear weapons across the globe, President George H. Bush withdrew all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”). The United States made this move partly to increase the bargaining ability of American diplomats, and partly because battle field nuclear weapons were increasingly viewed as obsolete in the age of precision strikes from a modern air force (Smith 24).
In the same year that the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, North Korea joined the United Nations. A year later, in 1992, North Korea signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguard agreement (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 409). While these might seem like promising conditions, what developed over the next several years was not as bright as initially indicated.
In May of 1992, North Korea submitted its first inventory of nuclear materials and allowed IAEA its first ad hoc inspection. Almost immediately, the IAEA reported discrepancies between what North Korea claimed to possess and what the IAEA suspected them possessing. The IAEA requested permission to inspect two suspected waste sites, but was denied permission by officials in Pyongyang. In 1993, North Korea proclaimed its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 410). This could not have come at a worse time for the treaty, because it was due for a 25 year review in 1995 in which signing countries could choose to extend, abandon, or amend the treaty. A North Korean withdraw, without consequence, at the very same time it appeared its nuclear programs were verging on weapons production, could spell disaster for a treaty which the United States clearly supported (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci xiv).
American foreign policy toward North Korea at this time took a diplomatic tone. While the Clinton administration didn’t want to reward North Korea for fulfilling its previous agreements, it was faced with two viable options: military action or diplomatic negotiation. Military action without at least an attempt at negotiation was deemed unacceptable and high level negotiations between the Unites States and North Korea were initiated. North Korea showed little interest in token concessions but expressed great interest in a reaching a deal which would give them modern reactor technology that was more proliferation resistant (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci XV).
When negotiations stalled in the spring of 1994, officials in Washington realized that an armed conflict could erupt and revised plans for air strikes against the North’s nuclear facilities. Additionally, troop numbers in South Korea were increased. Military officials estimated a possible death toll in South Korea of 1 million, including tens of thousands of Americans, if war once again broke out on the Korean Peninsula, (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci XV).
The height of the crisis occurred in June of 1994, when North Korea ignored U.S. warnings not to unload fuel rods loaded with weapons grade plutonium from its nuclear reactor. On June 15 of that year, former President Carter visited North Korea and received assurances from the government in Pyongyang that allowed IAEA officials and equipment to remain in North Korean nuclear facilities (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 413). A crisis was narrowly avoided and the situation immediately improved following continuing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.
The eventual agreement reached, the 1994 Agreed Framework, led to North Korea freezing its nuclear complex. North Korea received substantial economic incentives, such as heavy fuel oil, in return for encasing 8,000 plutonium fuel rods in cement and allowing United Nations inspectors unprecedented access to their nuclear facilities (Smith 27). In January of 1995, North Korea received the first shipment of 50,000 metric tons of heavy heating oil (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 415). Additionally, the agreement authorized building light water reactors. These modern reactors are more proliferation resistant than the reactors in operation at the time (“N Korean Nuclear Stand-off”). When, in 1998, there was concern about clandestine nuclear activities at other North Korean sites, the North capitulated to wider inspections carried out by US officials (Smith 27). It seemed at the time that diplomatic efforts had not only avoided another war, but had also made great strides in normalizing relations with North Korea and securing a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.
Nonetheless, Republican leaders in Congress were none too pleased with the 1994 agreement or the policy of engagement that American foreign policy had taken toward North Korea. Congress viewed the move as appeasement of a totalitarian, morally bankrupt regime, that couldn’t be trusted. Conservative members’ prevailing view was that the United States should push for regime change, or absorption by the South, instead of bribery and pay offs (Smith 104).
This disagreement between President Clinton and conservative members of Congress did not stop the Administration from continuing negotiations with leaders in Pyongyang. In November of 2000, it appeared that Clinton might visit Pyongyang in an attempt to buy out the North Korean missile program (Smith 32). United States negotiators were convinced that North Korea would join the Missile Technology Control Regime, an agreement which would have set restrictions at 180 miles for North Korean missiles (Smith 31). Japan would have greatly appreciated this restriction and the American goal of preventing a regional arms race would be bolstered. The deal, which never occurred, reputedly included a presidential visit and about 1 billion dollars annually in food aid for the North (Smith 32).
November of 2000 was tumultuous for American domestic politics. The contested election made a presidential visit a poor choice in the face of a constitutional crisis. It appeared that Clinton might once again make a trip after the election debacle was resolved, but the Bush transitional team made it clear that they did not support the deal and wouldn’t have fulfilled any obligations agreed to by the exiting administration (Smith 32).
The change in administrations also signaled a change in American foreign policy toward North Korea. The United States’ goals remained unchanged: avoid a regional arms race; ensure a non-nuclear North Korea; and protect American interests and security at home and abroad. Nonetheless, the incoming Bush administration employed dramatically altered methods to reach these ends.
The Bush administration avoided high level talks with North Korean officials for its first year in office, in sharp contrast with the almost continuous negotiations in which the Clinton administration engaged in (Smith 33). Early on, Secretary of State Colin Powell publically advocated keeping the 1994 Agreed Framework in place; the Administration ultimately rebuffed him (Smith 105). In the 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush specifically named North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” (“Bush State of the Union Address”). The same year, Bush also made it clear, in his National Security Doctrine, that the United States had a right to wage a preemptive war against rogue states posing a threat to the United States (Smith 105).
After they were introduced in 1958, the early use of nuclear weapons was central to American battle planning for any new armed conflict on the Peninsula. North Korea’s defensive posture is a result of this perceived U.S. nuclear threat. The North continues to station large numbers of troops along the North-South border so that, prior to an American nuclear strike, Northern troops can quickly cross into the South and intermingle with the population (Smith 24). The desire to counter this American nuclear threat weighed heavily on the North Koreans, although it has only been in the last few decades that they have obtained the technology to realize this desire. Furthermore, North Korea claims the right to develop a nuclear weapons program under international law, as means of self defense (Smith 24).
In the early 1980s North Korea began building a five megawatt reactor and in 1985 they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The reactor was completed and operational by 1986 (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 409). The United States has always taken the position that North Korea should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. However, the fact that the United States harbored nuclear weapons in South Korea made it difficult for the US to argue this. In 1991, as a part of a larger recall of nuclear weapons across the globe, President George H. Bush withdrew all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”). The United States made this move partly to increase the bargaining ability of American diplomats, and partly because battle field nuclear weapons were increasingly viewed as obsolete in the age of precision strikes from a modern air force (Smith 24).
In the same year that the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, North Korea joined the United Nations. A year later, in 1992, North Korea signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguard agreement (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 409). While these might seem like promising conditions, what developed over the next several years was not as bright as initially indicated.
In May of 1992, North Korea submitted its first inventory of nuclear materials and allowed IAEA its first ad hoc inspection. Almost immediately, the IAEA reported discrepancies between what North Korea claimed to possess and what the IAEA suspected them possessing. The IAEA requested permission to inspect two suspected waste sites, but was denied permission by officials in Pyongyang. In 1993, North Korea proclaimed its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 410). This could not have come at a worse time for the treaty, because it was due for a 25 year review in 1995 in which signing countries could choose to extend, abandon, or amend the treaty. A North Korean withdraw, without consequence, at the very same time it appeared its nuclear programs were verging on weapons production, could spell disaster for a treaty which the United States clearly supported (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci xiv).
American foreign policy toward North Korea at this time took a diplomatic tone. While the Clinton administration didn’t want to reward North Korea for fulfilling its previous agreements, it was faced with two viable options: military action or diplomatic negotiation. Military action without at least an attempt at negotiation was deemed unacceptable and high level negotiations between the Unites States and North Korea were initiated. North Korea showed little interest in token concessions but expressed great interest in a reaching a deal which would give them modern reactor technology that was more proliferation resistant (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci XV).
When negotiations stalled in the spring of 1994, officials in Washington realized that an armed conflict could erupt and revised plans for air strikes against the North’s nuclear facilities. Additionally, troop numbers in South Korea were increased. Military officials estimated a possible death toll in South Korea of 1 million, including tens of thousands of Americans, if war once again broke out on the Korean Peninsula, (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci XV).
The height of the crisis occurred in June of 1994, when North Korea ignored U.S. warnings not to unload fuel rods loaded with weapons grade plutonium from its nuclear reactor. On June 15 of that year, former President Carter visited North Korea and received assurances from the government in Pyongyang that allowed IAEA officials and equipment to remain in North Korean nuclear facilities (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 413). A crisis was narrowly avoided and the situation immediately improved following continuing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.
The eventual agreement reached, the 1994 Agreed Framework, led to North Korea freezing its nuclear complex. North Korea received substantial economic incentives, such as heavy fuel oil, in return for encasing 8,000 plutonium fuel rods in cement and allowing United Nations inspectors unprecedented access to their nuclear facilities (Smith 27). In January of 1995, North Korea received the first shipment of 50,000 metric tons of heavy heating oil (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 415). Additionally, the agreement authorized building light water reactors. These modern reactors are more proliferation resistant than the reactors in operation at the time (“N Korean Nuclear Stand-off”). When, in 1998, there was concern about clandestine nuclear activities at other North Korean sites, the North capitulated to wider inspections carried out by US officials (Smith 27). It seemed at the time that diplomatic efforts had not only avoided another war, but had also made great strides in normalizing relations with North Korea and securing a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.
Nonetheless, Republican leaders in Congress were none too pleased with the 1994 agreement or the policy of engagement that American foreign policy had taken toward North Korea. Congress viewed the move as appeasement of a totalitarian, morally bankrupt regime, that couldn’t be trusted. Conservative members’ prevailing view was that the United States should push for regime change, or absorption by the South, instead of bribery and pay offs (Smith 104).
This disagreement between President Clinton and conservative members of Congress did not stop the Administration from continuing negotiations with leaders in Pyongyang. In November of 2000, it appeared that Clinton might visit Pyongyang in an attempt to buy out the North Korean missile program (Smith 32). United States negotiators were convinced that North Korea would join the Missile Technology Control Regime, an agreement which would have set restrictions at 180 miles for North Korean missiles (Smith 31). Japan would have greatly appreciated this restriction and the American goal of preventing a regional arms race would be bolstered. The deal, which never occurred, reputedly included a presidential visit and about 1 billion dollars annually in food aid for the North (Smith 32).
November of 2000 was tumultuous for American domestic politics. The contested election made a presidential visit a poor choice in the face of a constitutional crisis. It appeared that Clinton might once again make a trip after the election debacle was resolved, but the Bush transitional team made it clear that they did not support the deal and wouldn’t have fulfilled any obligations agreed to by the exiting administration (Smith 32).
The change in administrations also signaled a change in American foreign policy toward North Korea. The United States’ goals remained unchanged: avoid a regional arms race; ensure a non-nuclear North Korea; and protect American interests and security at home and abroad. Nonetheless, the incoming Bush administration employed dramatically altered methods to reach these ends.
The Bush administration avoided high level talks with North Korean officials for its first year in office, in sharp contrast with the almost continuous negotiations in which the Clinton administration engaged in (Smith 33). Early on, Secretary of State Colin Powell publically advocated keeping the 1994 Agreed Framework in place; the Administration ultimately rebuffed him (Smith 105). In the 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush specifically named North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” (“Bush State of the Union Address”). The same year, Bush also made it clear, in his National Security Doctrine, that the United States had a right to wage a preemptive war against rogue states posing a threat to the United States (Smith 105).
- Thread Starter
- #19,928
While North Korea pushed for bilateral talks with the United States, the Bush administration favored, and insisted upon, six party talks in China (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 10). The six parties participating in the ongoing negotiations are China, the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia (“Joint Statement”). The next several years were characterized by heated rhetorical exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang, with little initial progress made in the multilateral talks. During this time, North Korea fired several test missiles that raised concerns among the international community. The situation worsened in October, 2006, when North Korea tested a nuclear weapon (“N Korean Nuclear Stand-off”). It seemed as though the Bush administration’s attempts to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of a rogue North Korean State failed, and although rudimentary, North Korea now possesses some form of nuclear weaponry.
In contrast, although the Bush Administration insisted upon multilateral talks with North Korea, it dealt almost unilaterally with Iraq. This apparent contradiction has not gone unnoticed in Congress, as many called to engage North Korea bilaterally (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 20). This insistence on multilateral action toward the North Korean nuclear problem is in line with the Administration’s 2002 release of, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The document calls for strengthening international treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and working closely with our allies to combat the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (“National Strategy” 4). Regardless of this disagreement between Congress and the President, the six party talks have recently proven fruitful.
The year 2007 seemed promising after several years of daunting failures for American foreign policy regarding security concerns over a nuclear North Korea. In February, North Korea agreed to not only verifiably shut down its nuclear reactors, but also permanently disable them. (Albright and Brannan 2). A crucial aspect in the disablement process included the failure to maintain the nuclear facilities, given the North’s rapid restart of its nuclear programs following the collapse of the 1994 agreed framework (Albright and Brannan 3).
The six party partners agreed to provide North Korea with 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil in exchange for shutting down the reactors (Kaufman, Stephen). Additionally, the agreement calls for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to be delivered once North Korea permanently, and verifiably, disabled its reactor (“Rice Hails”). For its part, the United States agreed to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states and begin the process of establishing normal diplomatic relations. The 2007 agreement is characterized as a first step although it failed to address the nuclear weapons North Korea currently possesses (“Rice Hails”).
The two administrations, Clinton and Bush, both generally ended in the same place while employing differing tactics. Clinton approached the issue more bilaterally and Bush tackled the problem more multilaterally. Initially humorous, this conclusion is also rendered disturbing when one realizes that regardless of the debated approach, it is likely that when President Bush leaves office, North Korea will possess nuclear weaponry. While the Bush administration might gain disablement, it came at a cost of allowing the North Koreans to obtain and test nuclear weapons. Whether this was a worthy trade-off, or a foreign policy error, is speculation best left for the pundits.
The current state of American foreign policy toward North Korea is a series of continuing negotiations with Pyongyang over nuclear weapons. When viewed from Bush’s inauguration to the present day, it is hard to characterize the path he took as successful while painting Clintons’ 1994 Framework as a failure of appeasement. Perhaps both administrations are guilty of appeasement, but only one is also guilty of allowing North Korea to obtain and test nuclear weapons on its watch.
Beyond the American foreign policy primary concern toward North Korea, of nuclear weapons, some secondary concerns include human rights and missile sales. While these issues are at times are intertwined with the major policy concern, usually used as a bargaining tool against US interests, they are nonetheless distinct areas of concern to be addressed here in limited scope.
Much of the information outlined below comes from defectors who fled North Korea for a better life. As such, perhaps these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact that North Korea forsakes foreign aid that would require international inspectors would indicate there is truth to be found in the defectors’ stories (“North Korea Human Rights” 14).
According to the State Department’s 2004 release, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, North Korea’s record on human rights is “extremely poor” and it continues to “commit numerous serious abuses” (“Country Reports”). These abuses led Dana Rohrabacher, a member on the Senate Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, to conclude that North Korea is “the world’s worst human right abuser” (“North Korea Human Rights” 7). In the early 1990s, an estimated 2 million people starved to death in North Korea while the government in Pyongyang devoted a tremendous amount of resources to their nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, North Korea allegedly operates gulag style political concentration camps where an estimated 150,000-200,000 political prisoners live (“North Korea Human Rights” 9).
The conditions for prisoners in these camps are horrid. Torture is regularly employed in the form of beatings, starvation, exposure, prolonged periods of forced standing, and electric shock. According to defectors, there is a low survival rate for those entering the camps. A large number of deaths occur as a result of violence, but forced labor with inadequate nutrition undoubtedly plays its part in the deaths as well. The prison system forbids live births; policy requires either forced abortion or infanticide (“Country Reports”).
These examples of egregious violations of decency and blatant disregard for the value of human life are but a brief outline of the total picture which makes up North Korea’s stance on human rights, the breadth of which cannot fully be appreciated in such a limited scope examination. However, in response to the total picture it has gained of the situation, the United States Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. The bill’s aim was to provide the funding and tools necessary to improve the situation for those who have fled and those who remain trapped in a life controlled by the repressive North Korean regime (“President’s Statement”).
Another secondary concern of the United States is North Korean missile sales. According to the testimony of General Thomas Schwartz, a former commander of the US forces in South Korea, North Korea is “the No. 1 proliferators of missiles” (Litner). The missile sales trouble the United States for two reasons: namely, the purchasers’ identities and the revenue North Korean receives.
Some of the countries reportedly purchasing missiles from North Korea include: Iran; Pakistan; Libya; Yemen; Syria; and Egypt. Not all of these countries are hostile to the United States, but Washington fears the sales could lead to advanced weaponry falling into the hands of international terrorist groups (Litner). Furthermore, approximately forty percent of North Korea’s estimated total exports are weapons sales that help fund their nuclear ambitions. Perhaps the importance of weapons sales to the North Korean economy is why previous attempts to buy out the program were made (Smith 31).
Unraveling the Unites States foreign policy toward North Korea, and the motivations for said policy, is a daunting task. Nevertheless, I have surveyed the historic position the United States has taken, the nuclear crises of the last two administrations, and an introductory examination of two of the many secondary issues facing policy leaders. In conclusion, foreign policy is hard.
In contrast, although the Bush Administration insisted upon multilateral talks with North Korea, it dealt almost unilaterally with Iraq. This apparent contradiction has not gone unnoticed in Congress, as many called to engage North Korea bilaterally (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 20). This insistence on multilateral action toward the North Korean nuclear problem is in line with the Administration’s 2002 release of, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The document calls for strengthening international treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and working closely with our allies to combat the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (“National Strategy” 4). Regardless of this disagreement between Congress and the President, the six party talks have recently proven fruitful.
The year 2007 seemed promising after several years of daunting failures for American foreign policy regarding security concerns over a nuclear North Korea. In February, North Korea agreed to not only verifiably shut down its nuclear reactors, but also permanently disable them. (Albright and Brannan 2). A crucial aspect in the disablement process included the failure to maintain the nuclear facilities, given the North’s rapid restart of its nuclear programs following the collapse of the 1994 agreed framework (Albright and Brannan 3).
The six party partners agreed to provide North Korea with 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil in exchange for shutting down the reactors (Kaufman, Stephen). Additionally, the agreement calls for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to be delivered once North Korea permanently, and verifiably, disabled its reactor (“Rice Hails”). For its part, the United States agreed to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states and begin the process of establishing normal diplomatic relations. The 2007 agreement is characterized as a first step although it failed to address the nuclear weapons North Korea currently possesses (“Rice Hails”).
The two administrations, Clinton and Bush, both generally ended in the same place while employing differing tactics. Clinton approached the issue more bilaterally and Bush tackled the problem more multilaterally. Initially humorous, this conclusion is also rendered disturbing when one realizes that regardless of the debated approach, it is likely that when President Bush leaves office, North Korea will possess nuclear weaponry. While the Bush administration might gain disablement, it came at a cost of allowing the North Koreans to obtain and test nuclear weapons. Whether this was a worthy trade-off, or a foreign policy error, is speculation best left for the pundits.
The current state of American foreign policy toward North Korea is a series of continuing negotiations with Pyongyang over nuclear weapons. When viewed from Bush’s inauguration to the present day, it is hard to characterize the path he took as successful while painting Clintons’ 1994 Framework as a failure of appeasement. Perhaps both administrations are guilty of appeasement, but only one is also guilty of allowing North Korea to obtain and test nuclear weapons on its watch.
Beyond the American foreign policy primary concern toward North Korea, of nuclear weapons, some secondary concerns include human rights and missile sales. While these issues are at times are intertwined with the major policy concern, usually used as a bargaining tool against US interests, they are nonetheless distinct areas of concern to be addressed here in limited scope.
Much of the information outlined below comes from defectors who fled North Korea for a better life. As such, perhaps these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact that North Korea forsakes foreign aid that would require international inspectors would indicate there is truth to be found in the defectors’ stories (“North Korea Human Rights” 14).
According to the State Department’s 2004 release, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, North Korea’s record on human rights is “extremely poor” and it continues to “commit numerous serious abuses” (“Country Reports”). These abuses led Dana Rohrabacher, a member on the Senate Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, to conclude that North Korea is “the world’s worst human right abuser” (“North Korea Human Rights” 7). In the early 1990s, an estimated 2 million people starved to death in North Korea while the government in Pyongyang devoted a tremendous amount of resources to their nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, North Korea allegedly operates gulag style political concentration camps where an estimated 150,000-200,000 political prisoners live (“North Korea Human Rights” 9).
The conditions for prisoners in these camps are horrid. Torture is regularly employed in the form of beatings, starvation, exposure, prolonged periods of forced standing, and electric shock. According to defectors, there is a low survival rate for those entering the camps. A large number of deaths occur as a result of violence, but forced labor with inadequate nutrition undoubtedly plays its part in the deaths as well. The prison system forbids live births; policy requires either forced abortion or infanticide (“Country Reports”).
These examples of egregious violations of decency and blatant disregard for the value of human life are but a brief outline of the total picture which makes up North Korea’s stance on human rights, the breadth of which cannot fully be appreciated in such a limited scope examination. However, in response to the total picture it has gained of the situation, the United States Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. The bill’s aim was to provide the funding and tools necessary to improve the situation for those who have fled and those who remain trapped in a life controlled by the repressive North Korean regime (“President’s Statement”).
Another secondary concern of the United States is North Korean missile sales. According to the testimony of General Thomas Schwartz, a former commander of the US forces in South Korea, North Korea is “the No. 1 proliferators of missiles” (Litner). The missile sales trouble the United States for two reasons: namely, the purchasers’ identities and the revenue North Korean receives.
Some of the countries reportedly purchasing missiles from North Korea include: Iran; Pakistan; Libya; Yemen; Syria; and Egypt. Not all of these countries are hostile to the United States, but Washington fears the sales could lead to advanced weaponry falling into the hands of international terrorist groups (Litner). Furthermore, approximately forty percent of North Korea’s estimated total exports are weapons sales that help fund their nuclear ambitions. Perhaps the importance of weapons sales to the North Korean economy is why previous attempts to buy out the program were made (Smith 31).
Unraveling the Unites States foreign policy toward North Korea, and the motivations for said policy, is a daunting task. Nevertheless, I have surveyed the historic position the United States has taken, the nuclear crises of the last two administrations, and an introductory examination of two of the many secondary issues facing policy leaders. In conclusion, foreign policy is hard.
ngsm13
5,000+ posts
BSEE
Oh there we go, there's more...
nG
nG
ngsm13
5,000+ posts
BSEE
Apparently I respond with teh quikcness!!!
nG
nG
bdawson72
5,000+ posts
Finally Has Bass Again
Im not reading that shit.
ngsm13
5,000+ posts
BSEE
Nor am I....
//content.invisioncic.com/y282845/emoticons/fyi.gif.9f1f679348da7204ce960cfc74bca8e0.gif
nG
//content.invisioncic.com/y282845/emoticons/fyi.gif.9f1f679348da7204ce960cfc74bca8e0.gif
nG
dragnix
5,000+ posts
LXIX
I would cheat, but I would never write a paper on Korea either
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