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<blockquote data-quote="faulkton" data-source="post: 4405743" data-attributes="member: 561910"><p>While North Korea pushed for bilateral talks with the United States, the Bush administration favored, and insisted upon, six party talks in China (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 10). The six parties participating in the ongoing negotiations are China, the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia (“Joint Statement”). The next several years were characterized by heated rhetorical exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang, with little initial progress made in the multilateral talks. During this time, North Korea fired several test missiles that raised concerns among the international community. The situation worsened in October, 2006, when North Korea tested a nuclear weapon (“N Korean Nuclear Stand-off”). It seemed as though the Bush administration’s attempts to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of a rogue North Korean State failed, and although rudimentary, North Korea now possesses some form of nuclear weaponry.</p><p></p><p>In contrast, although the Bush Administration insisted upon multilateral talks with North Korea, it dealt almost unilaterally with Iraq. This apparent contradiction has not gone unnoticed in Congress, as many called to engage North Korea bilaterally (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 20). This insistence on multilateral action toward the North Korean nuclear problem is in line with the Administration’s 2002 release of, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The document calls for strengthening international treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and working closely with our allies to combat the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (“National Strategy” 4). Regardless of this disagreement between Congress and the President, the six party talks have recently proven fruitful.</p><p></p><p>The year 2007 seemed promising after several years of daunting failures for American foreign policy regarding security concerns over a nuclear North Korea. In February, North Korea agreed to not only verifiably shut down its nuclear reactors, but also permanently disable them. (Albright and Brannan 2). A crucial aspect in the disablement process included the failure to maintain the nuclear facilities, given the North’s rapid restart of its nuclear programs following the collapse of the 1994 agreed framework (Albright and Brannan 3).</p><p></p><p>The six party partners agreed to provide North Korea with 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil in exchange for shutting down the reactors (Kaufman, Stephen). Additionally, the agreement calls for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to be delivered once North Korea permanently, and verifiably, disabled its reactor (“Rice Hails”). For its part, the United States agreed to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states and begin the process of establishing normal diplomatic relations. The 2007 agreement is characterized as a first step although it failed to address the nuclear weapons North Korea currently possesses (“Rice Hails”).</p><p></p><p>The two administrations, Clinton and Bush, both generally ended in the same place while employing differing tactics. Clinton approached the issue more bilaterally and Bush tackled the problem more multilaterally. Initially humorous, this conclusion is also rendered disturbing when one realizes that regardless of the debated approach, it is likely that when President Bush leaves office, North Korea will possess nuclear weaponry. While the Bush administration might gain disablement, it came at a cost of allowing the North Koreans to obtain and test nuclear weapons. Whether this was a worthy trade-off, or a foreign policy error, is speculation best left for the pundits.</p><p></p><p>The current state of American foreign policy toward North Korea is a series of continuing negotiations with Pyongyang over nuclear weapons. When viewed from Bush’s inauguration to the present day, it is hard to characterize the path he took as successful while painting Clintons’ 1994 Framework as a failure of appeasement. Perhaps both administrations are guilty of appeasement, but only one is also guilty of allowing North Korea to obtain and test nuclear weapons on its watch.</p><p></p><p>Beyond the American foreign policy primary concern toward North Korea, of nuclear weapons, some secondary concerns include human rights and missile sales. While these issues are at times are intertwined with the major policy concern, usually used as a bargaining tool against US interests, they are nonetheless distinct areas of concern to be addressed here in limited scope.</p><p></p><p>Much of the information outlined below comes from defectors who fled North Korea for a better life. As such, perhaps these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact that North Korea forsakes foreign aid that would require international inspectors would indicate there is truth to be found in the defectors’ stories (“North Korea Human Rights” 14).</p><p></p><p>According to the State Department’s 2004 release, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, North Korea’s record on human rights is “extremely poor” and it continues to “commit numerous serious abuses” (“Country Reports”). These abuses led Dana Rohrabacher, a member on the Senate Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, to conclude that North Korea is “the world’s worst human right abuser” (“North Korea Human Rights” 7). In the early 1990s, an estimated 2 million people starved to death in North Korea while the government in Pyongyang devoted a tremendous amount of resources to their nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, North Korea allegedly operates gulag style political concentration camps where an estimated 150,000-200,000 political prisoners live (“North Korea Human Rights” 9).</p><p></p><p>The conditions for prisoners in these camps are horrid. Torture is regularly employed in the form of beatings, starvation, exposure, prolonged periods of forced standing, and electric shock. According to defectors, there is a low survival rate for those entering the camps. A large number of deaths occur as a result of violence, but forced labor with inadequate nutrition undoubtedly plays its part in the deaths as well. The prison system forbids live births; policy requires either forced abortion or infanticide (“Country Reports”).</p><p></p><p>These examples of egregious violations of decency and blatant disregard for the value of human life are but a brief outline of the total picture which makes up North Korea’s stance on human rights, the breadth of which cannot fully be appreciated in such a limited scope examination. However, in response to the total picture it has gained of the situation, the United States Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. The bill’s aim was to provide the funding and tools necessary to improve the situation for those who have fled and those who remain trapped in a life controlled by the repressive North Korean regime (“President’s Statement”).</p><p></p><p>Another secondary concern of the United States is North Korean missile sales. According to the testimony of General Thomas Schwartz, a former commander of the US forces in South Korea, North Korea is “the No. 1 proliferators of missiles” (Litner). The missile sales trouble the United States for two reasons: namely, the purchasers’ identities and the revenue North Korean receives.</p><p></p><p>Some of the countries reportedly purchasing missiles from North Korea include: Iran; Pakistan; Libya; Yemen; Syria; and Egypt. Not all of these countries are hostile to the United States, but Washington fears the sales could lead to advanced weaponry falling into the hands of international terrorist groups (Litner). Furthermore, approximately forty percent of North Korea’s estimated total exports are weapons sales that help fund their nuclear ambitions. Perhaps the importance of weapons sales to the North Korean economy is why previous attempts to buy out the program were made (Smith 31).</p><p></p><p>Unraveling the Unites States foreign policy toward North Korea, and the motivations for said policy, is a daunting task. Nevertheless, I have surveyed the historic position the United States has taken, the nuclear crises of the last two administrations, and an introductory examination of two of the many secondary issues facing policy leaders. In conclusion, foreign policy is hard.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="faulkton, post: 4405743, member: 561910"] While North Korea pushed for bilateral talks with the United States, the Bush administration favored, and insisted upon, six party talks in China (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 10). The six parties participating in the ongoing negotiations are China, the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia (“Joint Statement”). The next several years were characterized by heated rhetorical exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang, with little initial progress made in the multilateral talks. During this time, North Korea fired several test missiles that raised concerns among the international community. The situation worsened in October, 2006, when North Korea tested a nuclear weapon (“N Korean Nuclear Stand-off”). It seemed as though the Bush administration’s attempts to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of a rogue North Korean State failed, and although rudimentary, North Korea now possesses some form of nuclear weaponry. In contrast, although the Bush Administration insisted upon multilateral talks with North Korea, it dealt almost unilaterally with Iraq. This apparent contradiction has not gone unnoticed in Congress, as many called to engage North Korea bilaterally (“North Korean Brinkmanship” 20). This insistence on multilateral action toward the North Korean nuclear problem is in line with the Administration’s 2002 release of, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The document calls for strengthening international treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and working closely with our allies to combat the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (“National Strategy” 4). Regardless of this disagreement between Congress and the President, the six party talks have recently proven fruitful. The year 2007 seemed promising after several years of daunting failures for American foreign policy regarding security concerns over a nuclear North Korea. In February, North Korea agreed to not only verifiably shut down its nuclear reactors, but also permanently disable them. (Albright and Brannan 2). A crucial aspect in the disablement process included the failure to maintain the nuclear facilities, given the North’s rapid restart of its nuclear programs following the collapse of the 1994 agreed framework (Albright and Brannan 3). The six party partners agreed to provide North Korea with 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil in exchange for shutting down the reactors (Kaufman, Stephen). Additionally, the agreement calls for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to be delivered once North Korea permanently, and verifiably, disabled its reactor (“Rice Hails”). For its part, the United States agreed to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states and begin the process of establishing normal diplomatic relations. The 2007 agreement is characterized as a first step although it failed to address the nuclear weapons North Korea currently possesses (“Rice Hails”). The two administrations, Clinton and Bush, both generally ended in the same place while employing differing tactics. Clinton approached the issue more bilaterally and Bush tackled the problem more multilaterally. Initially humorous, this conclusion is also rendered disturbing when one realizes that regardless of the debated approach, it is likely that when President Bush leaves office, North Korea will possess nuclear weaponry. While the Bush administration might gain disablement, it came at a cost of allowing the North Koreans to obtain and test nuclear weapons. Whether this was a worthy trade-off, or a foreign policy error, is speculation best left for the pundits. The current state of American foreign policy toward North Korea is a series of continuing negotiations with Pyongyang over nuclear weapons. When viewed from Bush’s inauguration to the present day, it is hard to characterize the path he took as successful while painting Clintons’ 1994 Framework as a failure of appeasement. Perhaps both administrations are guilty of appeasement, but only one is also guilty of allowing North Korea to obtain and test nuclear weapons on its watch. Beyond the American foreign policy primary concern toward North Korea, of nuclear weapons, some secondary concerns include human rights and missile sales. While these issues are at times are intertwined with the major policy concern, usually used as a bargaining tool against US interests, they are nonetheless distinct areas of concern to be addressed here in limited scope. Much of the information outlined below comes from defectors who fled North Korea for a better life. As such, perhaps these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact that North Korea forsakes foreign aid that would require international inspectors would indicate there is truth to be found in the defectors’ stories (“North Korea Human Rights” 14). According to the State Department’s 2004 release, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, North Korea’s record on human rights is “extremely poor” and it continues to “commit numerous serious abuses” (“Country Reports”). These abuses led Dana Rohrabacher, a member on the Senate Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, to conclude that North Korea is “the world’s worst human right abuser” (“North Korea Human Rights” 7). In the early 1990s, an estimated 2 million people starved to death in North Korea while the government in Pyongyang devoted a tremendous amount of resources to their nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, North Korea allegedly operates gulag style political concentration camps where an estimated 150,000-200,000 political prisoners live (“North Korea Human Rights” 9). The conditions for prisoners in these camps are horrid. Torture is regularly employed in the form of beatings, starvation, exposure, prolonged periods of forced standing, and electric shock. According to defectors, there is a low survival rate for those entering the camps. A large number of deaths occur as a result of violence, but forced labor with inadequate nutrition undoubtedly plays its part in the deaths as well. The prison system forbids live births; policy requires either forced abortion or infanticide (“Country Reports”). These examples of egregious violations of decency and blatant disregard for the value of human life are but a brief outline of the total picture which makes up North Korea’s stance on human rights, the breadth of which cannot fully be appreciated in such a limited scope examination. However, in response to the total picture it has gained of the situation, the United States Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. The bill’s aim was to provide the funding and tools necessary to improve the situation for those who have fled and those who remain trapped in a life controlled by the repressive North Korean regime (“President’s Statement”). Another secondary concern of the United States is North Korean missile sales. According to the testimony of General Thomas Schwartz, a former commander of the US forces in South Korea, North Korea is “the No. 1 proliferators of missiles” (Litner). The missile sales trouble the United States for two reasons: namely, the purchasers’ identities and the revenue North Korean receives. Some of the countries reportedly purchasing missiles from North Korea include: Iran; Pakistan; Libya; Yemen; Syria; and Egypt. Not all of these countries are hostile to the United States, but Washington fears the sales could lead to advanced weaponry falling into the hands of international terrorist groups (Litner). Furthermore, approximately forty percent of North Korea’s estimated total exports are weapons sales that help fund their nuclear ambitions. Perhaps the importance of weapons sales to the North Korean economy is why previous attempts to buy out the program were made (Smith 31). Unraveling the Unites States foreign policy toward North Korea, and the motivations for said policy, is a daunting task. Nevertheless, I have surveyed the historic position the United States has taken, the nuclear crises of the last two administrations, and an introductory examination of two of the many secondary issues facing policy leaders. In conclusion, foreign policy is hard. [/QUOTE]
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