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Message: <blockquote data-quote="faulkton" data-source="post: 4405733" data-attributes="member: 561910">The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea, is located in Eastern Asia and occupies the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. To its west lies Korea Bay and to the East is the Sea of Japan. North Korea shares its northern border with China and its southern border with the Republic of Korea, or South Korea. The capital city of North Korea is Pyongyang (“Background Note: North Korea”).  The estimated population in 2008 was roughly 23.5 million people. Kim Yong Il currently heads a highly centralized communist dictatorship system of government.  North Korea operates a centrally directed economy, which is one of the most closed in the world (“CIA World Factbook”). This economy doesn’t produce enough output to maintain the population, and North Korea is highly dependent upon foreign aid as a source of support.  Recent estimates attribute roughly one third of revenue as originating from foreign aid, one third from traditional exports, and one third from non-traditional sources such as drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and missile sales (Rotberg 92).The primary concern driving American foreign policy toward North Korea since the end of the Second World War has been security. The primary value driving United States foreign policy is self preservation in the face of threats, both internal to North Korea in recent years, and external to North Korea in the historical context of the Cold War.Prior to Japanese colonization in 1905, and complete annexation in 1910, the Korean Peninsula had operated as an independent and sovereign entity for much of its long history. The Peninsula remained under Japanese control until the Japanese surrendered after the nuclear attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima (“CIA World Factbook”). The surrender immediately triggered a division of the Peninsula with the Soviet Union having operational control north of the 38ths parallel and the United States administering the southern portion of the Peninsula. This was initially envisioned as a temporary division until such a time when the United States, Russia, and China could arrange for a trustee administration (“Background Note: North Korea”).In Moscow in December of 1945, a joint American-Soviet commission was formed which tried to hammer out a framework for a national government. The two super powers quickly deadlocked.  In 1947, after several years of fruitless meetings held in Seoul, the United States brought the matter before the United Nations General Assembly. The reality of the Cold War competition between world super powers quickly dashed any initial hopes for a reunified Korean Peninsula. In 1948, two separate nations were established, the Soviet supported Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the American backed Republic of Korea.  The political and social systems implemented in the newly created neighboring counties were diametrically opposed (“Background Note: North Korea”).While the North was receiving substantial support from the Soviet Union, the Soviets never viewed North Korea as important as satellite governments in Eastern Europe. In contrast, the United States viewed South Korea as positioned to harbor a first line of defense for Japan which would quickly regain its industrial powerhouse status while being stripped of its military and political might (Smith 22).  Additionally, the United States was increasingly worried about Soviet hegemony around the globe. South Korea was seen as the symbol of America’s commitment to constraining communism in Asia, although, like the Soviets in Eastern Europe, the Unites States wasn’t willing to make the same commitments to South Korea that it had made to its European allies (Kaufman, Burton 24).Truman saw South Korea in the same light as Greece and Turkey and in 1948 sent a military advisory group and a Marshal Plan type aid package. Regardless of the view Truman held, Congress refused to fund a 600 billion dollar aid package that would have put South Korea on par with Greece and Turkey (Smith 23). However, “the United States had drawn the line in Korea, and this commitment governed the Truman/Acheson decision to come to the defense of the ROK in 1950” (Smith 23).By early 1950, North Korea had a military advantage over its southern neighbors, specifically having better equipment and an air force. While the North was gradually building up troops and tanks along the 38th parallel, the conventional thinking that guided American policy toward North Korea, was that an attack was unlikely and certainly not imminent (Kaufman, Burton 27).  Nevertheless, the situation that was developing was seen in the context of the increasingly worrisome larger Cold War. Mao’s victory in China, and communist uprisings in Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were all seen as threats to American power and influence (Kaufman, Burton 27).  While it is unlikely that the United States was unprepared for indirect conflict with the Soviet Union in Asia, it is likely that they did not anticipate that proxy conflict occurring on the Korean Peninsula (Kaufman, Burton 29).Nonetheless, war broke out on the Korean Peninsula in June of 1950 when the North Koreans launched a surprise invasion of South Korea (Kaufman, Burton 29). Amid early victories by North Korea, American foreign policy was quickly redirected from an emphasis on providing aid to South Korea, to providing them with combat troops and military might. The North Koreans enjoyed early victories but were quickly rolled back after US troops successfully made amphibious landings at Inchon in September of 1950. With the tide now turning against the North, the United States marched north in an attempt to overthrow the communist regime. The decision to undertake the complete occupation of the peninsula and the elimination of the communist North Korean government brought Chinese forces into combat on the side of North Korea.With the introduction of the Chinese troops, the United States was pushed back to the 38th parallel once again (Smith 23). The seesaw action of the occupation, which at times might have seemed perilously close to victory and defeat for both sides, had ended in a stalemate along the lines from which the confrontation had initially begun. On July 27th 1953, both sides signed The Korean War Armistice Agreement, which ended the open hostility of the conflict (“Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement”). North Korea had failed to realize its goal of a unified Korean Peninsula under its control, and the United States had failed to see its goal of communist rollback on the peninsula come to fruition.From a historical perspective, what guided American foreign policy toward North Korea during the Korean War was clear.  Traditional thinking at the time was that the North Koreans had invaded under the direction of the Soviet Union and with the tacit consent of China (Kaufman, Burton 32). Under the doctrine that a victory for communism anywhere was a defeat of democracy everywhere, the United States’ involvement in, and the reaction garnered to, hostilities from the North, was predictable and justified. However, the evidence now suggests that while the war that played out most certainly was consistent with the larger Cold War between Washington and Moscow, when “the North apparently attacked the South unilaterally and without the knowledge of either the Soviet Union or the PRC,” clearly Korean internal struggles were also a factor.(Kaufman, Burton 32).All the same, the two Koreas’ domestic political issues were not what guided the United States during the conflict. The larger interests in the Cold War during this period guided American foreign policy in general and the police action against North Korea was no exception. The United States saw the North Korean invasion as a communist attack against free world interests as well as sponsored and controlled by the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of the United States, this was a test of American resolve and the response had to send a clear and concise message that America would protect its interests in not only Asia, but worldwide. Of great concern was that a loss in South Korea would guide communist moves around the world and could have been the first of many Soviet thrusts globally, and that these would come at the cost of both American influence and power worldwide (Kaufman, Burton 34). The United States, in order to protect its status and image, had to send a strong message to both its adversaries and allies. That message was that the United States would not stand by idly in the face of Soviet aggression and communist expansion, and that America would take whatever steps necessary to protect its interests and the independence of its allies.Two lessons are learned from the brief outline of Korean history and American foreign policy toward the Peninsula provided here. First, American military superiority, particularly nuclear weaponry, was instrumental in securing freedom from Japanese control and should not be underestimated.  Second, the world’s super powers were more interested in using the Korean Peninsula as a pawn in their own struggles than it was in Korean unification or the plight of the Korean people. These lessons are important to recall when examining what makes up the bulk of American foreign policy toward North Korea today, a nuclear armed rogue nation and an obvious security threat to the United States and its global interests.</blockquote>

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