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Message: <blockquote data-quote="faulkton" data-source="post: 4405738" data-attributes="member: 561910">A brief history of nuclear weaponry on the Korean Peninsula is in order prior to examining the first nuclear showdown that occurred in the 1990s. Nuclear weapons first arrived on the Peninsula in the late 1950s (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”). Ironically, the United States introduced them to deter further Northern Aggression against the South.  American deployment of nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula broke article 13D of the Armistice Agreement, and was of great concern to North Korea since their introduction (Smith 24). At the height of build up about 950 nuclear weapons were deployed at US bases in South Korea (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”).After they were introduced in 1958, the early use of nuclear weapons was central to American battle planning for any new armed conflict on the Peninsula. North Korea’s defensive posture is a result of this perceived U.S. nuclear threat. The North continues to station large numbers of troops along the North-South border so that, prior to an American nuclear strike, Northern troops can quickly cross into the South and intermingle with the population (Smith 24). The desire to counter this American nuclear threat weighed heavily on the North Koreans, although it has only been in the last few decades that they have obtained the technology to realize this desire. Furthermore, North Korea claims the right to develop a nuclear weapons program under international law, as means of self defense (Smith 24).In the early 1980s North Korea began building a five megawatt reactor and in 1985 they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The reactor was completed and operational by 1986 (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 409). The United States has always taken the position that North Korea should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. However, the fact that the United States harbored nuclear weapons in South Korea made it difficult for the US to argue this. In 1991, as a part of a larger recall of nuclear weapons across the globe, President George H. Bush withdrew all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula (“A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea”). The United States made this move partly to increase the bargaining ability of American diplomats, and partly because battle field nuclear weapons were increasingly viewed as obsolete in the age of precision strikes from a modern air force (Smith 24).In the same year that the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, North Korea joined the United Nations. A year later, in 1992, North Korea signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguard agreement (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 409). While these might seem like promising conditions, what developed over the next several years was not as bright as initially indicated.In May of 1992, North Korea submitted its first inventory of nuclear materials and allowed IAEA its first ad hoc inspection. Almost immediately, the IAEA reported discrepancies between what North Korea claimed to possess and what the IAEA suspected them possessing. The IAEA requested permission to inspect two suspected waste sites, but was denied permission by officials in Pyongyang. In 1993, North Korea proclaimed its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 410). This could not have come at a worse time for the treaty, because it was due for a 25 year review in 1995 in which signing countries could choose to extend, abandon, or amend the treaty. A North Korean withdraw, without consequence, at the very same time it appeared its nuclear programs were verging on weapons production, could spell disaster for a treaty which the United States clearly supported (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci xiv).American foreign policy toward North Korea at this time took a diplomatic tone. While the Clinton administration didn’t want to reward North Korea for fulfilling its previous agreements, it was faced with two viable options: military action or diplomatic negotiation. Military action without at least an attempt at negotiation was deemed unacceptable and high level negotiations between the Unites States and North Korea were initiated. North Korea showed little interest in token concessions but expressed great interest in a reaching a deal which would give them modern reactor technology that was more proliferation resistant (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci XV).When negotiations stalled in the spring of 1994, officials in Washington realized that an armed conflict could erupt and revised plans for air strikes against the North’s nuclear facilities. Additionally, troop numbers in South Korea were increased. Military officials estimated a possible death toll in South Korea of 1 million, including tens of thousands of Americans, if war once again broke out on the Korean Peninsula, (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci XV).The height of the crisis occurred in June of 1994, when North Korea ignored U.S. warnings not to unload fuel rods loaded with weapons grade plutonium from its nuclear reactor.   On June 15 of that year, former President Carter visited North Korea and received assurances from the government in Pyongyang that allowed IAEA officials and equipment to remain in North Korean nuclear facilities (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 413). A crisis was narrowly avoided and the situation immediately improved following continuing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.The eventual agreement reached, the 1994 Agreed Framework, led to North Korea freezing its nuclear complex. North Korea received substantial economic incentives, such as heavy fuel oil, in return for encasing 8,000 plutonium fuel rods  in cement and allowing United Nations inspectors unprecedented access to their nuclear facilities (Smith 27). In January of 1995, North Korea received the first shipment of 50,000 metric tons of heavy heating oil (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 415). Additionally, the agreement authorized building light water reactors. These modern reactors are more proliferation resistant than the reactors in operation at the time (“N Korean Nuclear Stand-off”). When, in 1998, there was concern about clandestine nuclear activities at other North Korean sites, the North capitulated to wider inspections carried out by US officials (Smith 27). It seemed at the time that diplomatic efforts had not only avoided another war, but had also made great strides in normalizing relations with North Korea and securing a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.Nonetheless, Republican leaders in Congress were none too pleased with the 1994 agreement or the policy of engagement that American foreign policy had taken toward North Korea. Congress viewed the move as appeasement of a totalitarian, morally bankrupt regime, that couldn’t be trusted. Conservative members’ prevailing view was that the United States should push for regime change, or absorption by the South, instead of bribery and pay offs (Smith 104).This disagreement between President Clinton and conservative members of Congress did not stop the Administration from continuing negotiations with leaders in Pyongyang. In November of 2000, it appeared that Clinton might visit Pyongyang in an attempt to buy out the North Korean missile program (Smith 32). United States negotiators were convinced that North Korea would join the Missile Technology Control Regime, an agreement which would have set restrictions at 180 miles for North Korean missiles (Smith 31). Japan would have greatly appreciated this restriction and the American goal of preventing a regional arms race would be bolstered. The deal, which never occurred, reputedly included a presidential visit and about 1 billion dollars annually in food aid for the North (Smith 32).November of 2000 was tumultuous for American domestic politics. The contested election made a presidential visit a poor choice in the face of a constitutional crisis. It appeared that Clinton might once again make a trip after the election debacle was resolved, but the Bush transitional team made it clear that they did not support the deal and wouldn’t have fulfilled any obligations agreed to by the exiting administration (Smith 32).The change in administrations also signaled a change in American foreign policy toward North Korea. The United States’ goals remained unchanged:  avoid a regional arms race; ensure a non-nuclear North Korea; and protect American interests and security at home and abroad. Nonetheless, the incoming Bush administration employed dramatically altered methods to reach these ends.The Bush administration avoided high level talks with North Korean officials for its first year in office, in sharp contrast with the almost continuous negotiations in which the Clinton administration engaged in (Smith 33). Early on, Secretary of State Colin Powell publically advocated keeping the 1994 Agreed Framework in place; the Administration ultimately rebuffed him (Smith 105). In the 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush specifically named North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” (“Bush State of the Union Address”). The same year, Bush also made it clear, in his National Security Doctrine, that the United States had a right to wage a preemptive war against rogue states posing a threat to the United States (Smith 105).</blockquote>

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