- Thread Starter
- #12,016
Its pretty bad. It's just a series of long and convoluted sentences that really don't say much... this is what i have thus far:
From within the context of my existence there is nothing ordinary about the actions of the 101st battalion, or the context in which they occurred. It is hard for me to even imagine living in a time and place where my own response to such conditions could be tested. Yet, from the comfort and safety of my placement deep within American borders and culture, I attempt to understand the genocidal behavior of the 101st and its possible implications about humankind. In his book, particularly the afterword, Browning takes a stand against an intentionalist approach to causality and rejects the mono-causal explanation that a particularly vehement form of anti-Semitic culture is to blame. Browning has convinced me that we should favor a more multi-faceted method of causality. This idea is troubling because of the implications it holds for humanity. It is much more comforting to believe that the German culture of the time was so poisonously anti-Semitic that it gave rise, almost on its own accord, to the holocaust. I would find greater consolation in a world where the holocaust is the sole result of a culture not likely to be reborn in my modern world. Much less comforting and much more frightening, is the idea that the phenomenon known as the holocaust had less to do with the specifics of the German culture and more to do with innate qualities possessed by the vast majority of humanity.
Lead by Major Trapp, a man not fit for the SS, the battalion was comprised of ordinary Germans of whom 25% were party members. The majority of the men were working class, had little education and were old enough to have been socialized prior to the rise of the Nazi party. The men were of the age to have families of their own, and yet the vast majority were able to participate firsthand in the mass murder of women and children. Browning goes to great length to characterize the social context from which these men emerge, and by doing so paints a picture of men who were not the ideal type of a Nazi. Based on the background information given by Browning these men were as unexceptional as the title of his book implies. The selection method, or more accurately the deselection method, used to create the battalion doesn’t lend itself well to the men being the zealot ideological fanatics required of an intentionalist explanation, and as Browning points out it is more indicative that the men were not fanatic ideologues at all. The men of the 101st of course were the product of their social context and obviously the particular social context from which they emerged was overtly anti-Semitic. This is unquestionable. What is disputed is the extent to which their social context dictated their actions when they were faced with being an active participant in the final solution. Were their actions the unalterable result of the manifest wishes of the German people as a whole, or were their actions the result of the combination of personal choice and social-psychological characteristics intrinsic to the vast majority of the world’s population. I see the argument, in its simplest and most base form, coming down to whether or not the ability to willingly participate is indicative of an inane trait in humanity or a trait particular to their specific social context and culture which lead to only one outcome.
Browning outlines many elements that, when combined, might explain why the majority of men in the 101st battalion were capable, under the circumstances they found themselves in, of the murderous actions they in fact committed. Upon consideration of these elements in the total context of the events, his argument seems more convincing than a mono-causal explanation that the events took place as the unavoidable outcome of anti-Semitism internalized and accepted by the mass culture of Germany prior to and during the Nazi regime’s control. The latter argument, while succinct and parsimonious, seems inadequate by comparison when viewed from my vantage point as a sociology major living in America during the 21st century. The contributing factors salient enough to warrant qualification and detailed application to the situation of the 101st battalion by Browning, are: “war time brutalization, racism, segmentation and routinization of the task, special selection of the perpetrators, careerism, obedience to orders, deference to authority, ideological indoctrination, and conformity”.
War is brutal and difficult combat experiences can understandably lead one to rationalize brutalization of those labeled as the enemy. History is full of anecdotes involving combat stressors leading men to actions they most likely wouldn’t have committed under normal situations. The men of the 101st battalion had no prior combat experience to fuel such a reaction.
From within the context of my existence there is nothing ordinary about the actions of the 101st battalion, or the context in which they occurred. It is hard for me to even imagine living in a time and place where my own response to such conditions could be tested. Yet, from the comfort and safety of my placement deep within American borders and culture, I attempt to understand the genocidal behavior of the 101st and its possible implications about humankind. In his book, particularly the afterword, Browning takes a stand against an intentionalist approach to causality and rejects the mono-causal explanation that a particularly vehement form of anti-Semitic culture is to blame. Browning has convinced me that we should favor a more multi-faceted method of causality. This idea is troubling because of the implications it holds for humanity. It is much more comforting to believe that the German culture of the time was so poisonously anti-Semitic that it gave rise, almost on its own accord, to the holocaust. I would find greater consolation in a world where the holocaust is the sole result of a culture not likely to be reborn in my modern world. Much less comforting and much more frightening, is the idea that the phenomenon known as the holocaust had less to do with the specifics of the German culture and more to do with innate qualities possessed by the vast majority of humanity.
Lead by Major Trapp, a man not fit for the SS, the battalion was comprised of ordinary Germans of whom 25% were party members. The majority of the men were working class, had little education and were old enough to have been socialized prior to the rise of the Nazi party. The men were of the age to have families of their own, and yet the vast majority were able to participate firsthand in the mass murder of women and children. Browning goes to great length to characterize the social context from which these men emerge, and by doing so paints a picture of men who were not the ideal type of a Nazi. Based on the background information given by Browning these men were as unexceptional as the title of his book implies. The selection method, or more accurately the deselection method, used to create the battalion doesn’t lend itself well to the men being the zealot ideological fanatics required of an intentionalist explanation, and as Browning points out it is more indicative that the men were not fanatic ideologues at all. The men of the 101st of course were the product of their social context and obviously the particular social context from which they emerged was overtly anti-Semitic. This is unquestionable. What is disputed is the extent to which their social context dictated their actions when they were faced with being an active participant in the final solution. Were their actions the unalterable result of the manifest wishes of the German people as a whole, or were their actions the result of the combination of personal choice and social-psychological characteristics intrinsic to the vast majority of the world’s population. I see the argument, in its simplest and most base form, coming down to whether or not the ability to willingly participate is indicative of an inane trait in humanity or a trait particular to their specific social context and culture which lead to only one outcome.
Browning outlines many elements that, when combined, might explain why the majority of men in the 101st battalion were capable, under the circumstances they found themselves in, of the murderous actions they in fact committed. Upon consideration of these elements in the total context of the events, his argument seems more convincing than a mono-causal explanation that the events took place as the unavoidable outcome of anti-Semitism internalized and accepted by the mass culture of Germany prior to and during the Nazi regime’s control. The latter argument, while succinct and parsimonious, seems inadequate by comparison when viewed from my vantage point as a sociology major living in America during the 21st century. The contributing factors salient enough to warrant qualification and detailed application to the situation of the 101st battalion by Browning, are: “war time brutalization, racism, segmentation and routinization of the task, special selection of the perpetrators, careerism, obedience to orders, deference to authority, ideological indoctrination, and conformity”.
War is brutal and difficult combat experiences can understandably lead one to rationalize brutalization of those labeled as the enemy. History is full of anecdotes involving combat stressors leading men to actions they most likely wouldn’t have committed under normal situations. The men of the 101st battalion had no prior combat experience to fuel such a reaction.
