Final voyage and wreck
Fitzgerald left Superior, Wisconsin on the afternoon of Sunday, November 9, 1975 under Captain Ernest M. McSorley. She was en route to the steel mill on Zug Island, near Detroit, Michigan, with a full cargo of taconite.[7] A second freighter, Arthur M. Anderson, destined for Gary, Indiana out of Two Harbors, Minnesota, joined up with Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald, being the faster ship, took the lead while Anderson trailed not far behind.[8]
Crossing Lake Superior at about 13 knots (24 km/h; 15 mph), the boats encountered a massive winter storm, reporting winds in excess of 50 knots (93 km/h; 58 mph) and waves as high as 35 feet (11 m). Because of the storm, the Soo Locks at Sault Ste. Marie were closed. The freighters altered their courses northward, seeking shelter along the Canadian coast. Later, they would cross to Whitefish Bay to approach the locks.
Late in the afternoon of Monday, November 10, sustained winds of 50 knots were observed across eastern Lake Superior. Anderson was struck by a 75-knot (139 km/h; 86 mph) hurricane-force gust. At 3:30 pm Fitzgerald radioed Anderson to report a minor list developing and top-side damage including the loss of radar.[9] Visibility was poor due to heavy snow, and the Coast Guard warned all ships to find safe harbor.[10] Two of the Fitzgerald's six bilge pumps were running continuously to discharge shipped water. The lighthouse and navigational radio beacon at Whitefish Point had also been knocked out by the storm. Fitzgerald was ahead of Anderson at the time, effectively blind; therefore, she slowed to come within 10 miles (16 km) range so she could receive radar guidance from the other ship.[9]
For a time Anderson directed the Fitzgerald toward the relative safety of Whitefish Bay. At 5:45 pm, Captain McSorley radioed another ship, Avafors, to report that Fitzgerald was suffering a bad list, had lost her radars, and had seas washing over her decks. McSorley described the situation as, "One of the worst seas I've ever been in."[9]
The last communication from the doomed ship came at approximately 7:10 pm, when Anderson notified Fitzgerald of an upbound ship and asked how she was doing. McSorley reported, "We are holding our own." A few minutes later, she apparently sank; no distress signal was received. Ten minutes later Anderson could neither raise Fitzgerald by radio, nor detect her on radar. At 8:32 pm, Anderson was finally able to convince the U. S. Coast Guard that the Fitzgerald had gone missing. Up until that time, the Coast Guard was looking for a 16 foot outboard lost in the area. The United States Coast Guard finally took Captain of the Anderson, Jesse "Bernie" Cooper seriously shortly after 8:30 PM. The Coast Guard then asked the "Anderson to turn around and look for survivors".
Search
Once Anderson noted the loss of Fitzgerald, a search was launched for survivors. The initial search consisted of the Arthur M. Anderson, and a second freighter, SS William Clay Ford. The efforts of a third freighter, the Canadian vessel Hilda Marjanne, were foiled by the weather. The U.S. Coast Guard launched three aircraft, but could not mobilize any ships. A Coast Guard buoy tender, Woodrush, was able to launch within two and a half hours, but took a day to arrive. The search recovered debris, including lifeboats and rafts, but no survivors.
Underwater survey
The wreck was first located by a U.S. Navy aircraft with on-board magnetic anomaly detector equipment, normally used to detect submarines. The wreck was further surveyed using side scan sonar on November 14 to November 16 by the Coast Guard. The sonar revealed two large objects lying close together on the lake floor. A second survey took place from November 22 through November 25 by a private contractor, Seaward, Inc.
In 1976, from May 20 to May 28, an unmanned U.S. Navy submersible photographed the wreck. This submersible, CURV III, consisted of an underwater vehicle connected via umbilical control to a surface support ship. On-board imaging equipment included one 35 mm still and two black-and-white video cameras. It found Edmund Fitzgerald lying in two large pieces in 530 feet (160 m) of water. The bow section, approximately 276 feet (84 m) long, lay upright in the mud. The stern section lay 170 feet (52 m) away, inverted (face down), at a 50-degree angle from the bow. Metal and taconite heaps between the bow and stern comprised the remnants of the mid-section.
Cause and controversy
When Fitzgerald first vanished, it was widely believed the boat had snapped in half on the lake surface owing to storm action. Similar surface breakups in the past suggested bow and stern sections would be found miles apart on the lake floor. When underwater surveys revealed these sections were just 50 yards (46 m) from each other, it was concluded that Fitzgerald had instead broken upon hitting the lake floor.
A Coast Guard investigation postulated that the accident was caused by ineffective hatch closures. These devices were unable to prevent waves from inundating the cargo hold. The flooding occurred gradually and probably imperceptibly throughout the final day, and finally resulted in a fatal loss of buoyancy and stability. As a result, the boat plummeted to the bottom without warning.
The Coast Guard report proved controversial. Their conclusions failed to address critical pieces of evidence. Also, whether coincidence or not, the report always placed blame on the crew, which prevented a costly lawsuit against Oglebay-Norton. The most common alternative theory contends that inoperative radar forced the crew to rely on inaccurate charts. The Canadian and American versions of the same chart placed shoals and shallow water in different places, and failed to mark some shoals at all. As a result, Fitzgerald briefly ran aground or scraped a shoal near Caribou Island without the crew being aware of it. Consequently, she received bottom damage, which caused her to gradually take on water until she sank so suddenly in the deep water that none of her crew had time to react. The ship, pile-driving into the lake bottom, snapped in half, and its stern landed upside-down on the bottom. (If so, given the ship's length vs. the depth of the water, the stern could still have been above water when the bow hit bottom.) This theory is supported by final radio communications between Anderson and Fitzgerald; Anderson had been struck by two large waves that were heading toward Fitzgerald. If the hull had indeed been breached, it would be difficult to prove. Fitzgerald has settled in mud up to her load marks, making it impossible to inspect for damage.
A documentary created and aired by the Discovery Channel investigated a large "fold" found in the hull plating. Previous defects with cargo hold covers and clamps as well as cracking issues were also addressed. Through the use of wave tanks and computer simulation, the Discovery Channel team concluded the loss of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald was due to a rogue wave. Reports show three large waves, were detected, two of which were reported by the Anderson. Such a grouping of waves is often called "three sisters". As per the investigation, it was theorized that the Fitzgerald was badly battered by the first two waves, further damaging the hatch covers. It was surmised ultimately that the Fitzgerald took on water through the damaged cargo hold covers, which flooded the ore cargo and severely stressed the ship's hull, and was then overwhelmed by the third wave that snapped the weakened ship in half.